Introduction
Paul Grice was concerned with the way logical terms such as some, or, and and take on extralogical meanings in conversational contexts. To take one example, Grice (1989) described or as having a weak word meaning identical to formal logic's inclusive disjunction (which is false only in the case where both disjuncts are) but as conveying in conversation a stronger speaker's meaning corresponding to the exclusive disjunction (which is false in the case where both disjuncts are false or where both are true). Grice used the term implicature to describe the pragmatic inference linking word meanings to speaker's meanings and laid the foundations for nearly all of the linguistic-pragmatic studies found in this volume. 1 The idea of submitting Grice's hyoptheses to experimental investigations is extremely attractive. But what would testable processing predictions look like precisely?
Grice assumed that hearers expect speakers, in producing an utterance, to obey a set of maxims following from a general co-operative principle. When their initial interpretation of an utterance fails to confirm that the speaker has obeyed the maxims, or at least the Sternberg (1979, p. 492) plainly said after coming across the same result that Paris reported:
The data show an interesting interaction between age and interpretation of or…children at the lowest grade level use the inclusive interpretation of or in preference to the exclusive interpretation…At the higher grade levels, children show a strong tendency to use the exclusive interpretation in preference to the inclusive interpretation.
What is absent in these papers is an explanation for this effect. Although researchers recognized its curious nature, they were generally mystified by it. After all, it was rare to find children behaving more logically than adults. Viewed through the prism of pragmatics, however, the effect becomes obvious: the linguistically encoded meanings of weak terms (like or, some, and might) are compatible with minimal interpretations of underinformative items while pragmatic inferences increase with age. That is, the minimal interpretation for each of these terms is compatible with a logical one (e.g. when someone says or, it means that at least one disjunct is true, when someone says some, it means that at least one of several quantified objects is the case etc.). Pragmatic enrichments provide for the adult responses. That is, adults are more likely to apply pragmatic principles than children and thus enrich the interpretation of or by adding but not both. This pragmatic insight could readily solve a small mystery in the developmental literature. The next section shows how just how general this effect is.
Establishing the developmental-pragmatic effect
Once appreciated as a pragmatic effect, understanding it even better has played a role in creating a small cottage industry of experiments in my lab and others'. My lab undertook a series of experiments that employed two classes of weak scalar utterances, modals and existential quantifiers (Noveck, 2001) . For modals, the critical test item was there might be a parrot when something like there must be a parrot would be more appropriate. For quantifiers, the test items were statements like Some elephants have trunks (and we know that All elephants have trunks). The scenarios from this paper along with its main results are presented in the next two sections.
The modal might
Consider a reasoning task involving three boxes. One is open and has a toy parrot and a toy bear in it (the Parrot+Bear Box), the second is open and has only a parrot (the Parrot-only Box), and the third stays covered (Box C). Participants are told that Box C has the same content as either the Parrot+Bear Box or the Parrot-only Box.
A puppet presents eight statements and it is the participant's task to say whether the puppet's claim is right or not. The critical statement that allows us to study the pragmatic inference is There might be a parrot in the box when the evidence shows that there must be a parrot. On the one hand, if the participant adopts an explicit, logical interpretation of Might (where Might is compatible with Must), one would expect an affirmative reply ("the puppet is right"). On the other hand, if the participant adopts a pragmatic, restrictive interpretation for Might (where Might is not compatible with Must) one would expect a negative reply ("the puppet is wrong") or at least some equivocation. Sevenyear-olds' rate of logical interpretations with respect to There might be a parrot in the box (80%) is intriguing not only because they respond at rates that are significantly above chance levels but because they do so at a rate that is significantly higher than that of the adults' (35%), which resembles chance levels.
Existential quantifiers
In another experiment investigating quantified statements, 8-year-old and 10-yearold children and adults were confronted with various statements including a set that can be exemplified with Some elephants have trunks. These kinds of utterances have the potential to generate scalar inferences of the sort Not all elephants have trunks which leads to a contradiction with one's stereotypical knowledge about elephants. Two features of these studies are worth pointing out. One is that there were 6 kinds of statements overall based on there being Existential and Universal Quantifiers (Some and All) and three kinds of relations: A) Absurd (e.g. Some chairs tell time/All crows have radios), B) Appropriate (e.g. Some houses have bricks/All elephants have trunks), and Inappropriate (e.g. Some giraffes have long necks/All dogs have spots). It is the Inappropriate condition for Some that presents us with the infelicitous, underinformative case. The other important feature is that the test was conducted under double blind conditions. The experimenter was simply told to present the utterances in an even tone of voice before soliciting an Agree/Disagree response (and the experimenter later told me that she thought the absurd statements were the critical ones). Aside from near perfect responses to the five indisputable statements, the results showed that all the children were very likely to agree (at rates at or above 85%) with the Underinformative statements and significantly more so than adults, who were split in their responses (41% of participants consistently agreed with the Underinformative statements).
Understanding the developmental-pragmatic effect even better
I have presented just two examples of new studies investigating this developmental-pragmatic effect that was first unearthed in pre-existing literature.
Others have reported similar findings, making this a robust effect (see Guasti et al. in preparation, Chierchia et al., this volume, Chapter 13; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003) .
When a relatively weak term is used in scenarios where a stronger term is justified, younger children are typically more likely than adults to find the utterance acceptable.
Several issues remain. Some colleagues have reacted to my data as if I mean to say that children are pragmatically delayed at young ages (Meroni, Gualmini, & Crain, 2001 ). This is very far from what is claimed. In fact, it was anticipated that "one would find the same effect among even younger children if a task were made easy" enough (Noveck, 2001, page 184) . Another issue concerns the relevance of this effect to resolving the debate between the two opposing accounts of scalar inferences compared earlier. These developmental findings do not favor one account over another because both could explain it. From the Default inference perspective, it could be claimed that scalar inferences become automatic with age and that our results are simply revealing how such inference-making matures. In contrast, Relevance Theory would suggest that children and adults use the same comprehension mechanisms but that greater cognitive resources are available for adults, which in turn encourages them to draw out more pragmatic inferences.
One way to address both of these issues is by finding a link between scalarinference production and task complexity. If one assumes that cognitive effort is indeed a critical factor in such inference-making, a simpler task ought to make its production more likely (for similar arguments, see Noveck, Chierchia, Chevaux, Guelminger, & Sylvestre, 2002) . Such a finding would have to be considered favorable to Relevance Theory because it would indicate that relative effort of utterance interpretation in context is critical for implicature production. If scalar implicatures were automatic and linked to particular words, task complexity ought not to matter. This is what Nausicaa Pouscoulous, Guy Politzer, Ann Bastide and I aimed to show in a series of studies conducted with much younger children. In these studies, we show that, even in the simplified scenarios, one finds that children become progressively more pragmatic with age.
Existential quantifiers again
We employed a reasoning scenario that tested quantifier comprehension but that (unlike the above study on Some) did not require long-term knowledge. In our first experiment, we presented a standard paradigm that placed four cardboard boxes in front of participants with different plastic animals placed in and around the boxes. The 9-yearold and adult participants were asked whether they agreed with a puppet that made statements about the scenario. Among numerous control items was the critical test statement -"Some turtles are in the boxes" (Certaines tortues sont dans les boîtes) --when all of the presented turtles were in the boxes. The responses to these statements are then used as a dependent variable to assess whether participants make the scalar inference. If participants were to make the scalar inference, they would disagree with the puppet (because all the turtles are in the boxes), whereas if they treated the word some in a logical way they would agree with the statement. The results confirmed the previous findings (92% of children responded logically whereas 47% of adults did). This is the scenario that was modified so that younger children could be tested.
We made three changes which we believed would reduce the effort necessary to perform the task, thus encouraging the pragmatic responses in children. First, we used the French word quelques instead of certains. Although both words mean some, teachers indicated that children were more comfortable with the former. Second, the presentation concerned only tokens that were in boxes; there were no animals and these tokens were not left strewn around outside the boxes (as was the case for the animals in the standard paradigm). All the statements concerned the contents of the boxes. Third, we asked participants to perform an action on the basis of the puppet's instructions rather than making a judgment on the validity of the puppet's statements. Participants were asked to fulfill a wish made by a puppet concerning the items in the boxes. For example, the puppet would say "I would like all of the boxes to have a token", and the participant would have to determine whether or not they should alter the scenario in order to comply with the wish. Of course, the utterance of interest arose when the puppet said Je voudrais que quelques boites contiennent un jeton (I would like some of the boxes to have a token) when all of the boxes already contained a token. If participants believed that some was compatible with all they ought to leave the boxes unchanged (which is actually difficult to do given that a request implies that a change is called for); otherwise they could remove some of the tokens.
When very young children (4 year olds, 5 year olds, and 7 year olds) are presented with a scenario having four boxes and each with a token, one finds many more responses indicating scalar inference generation than in the prior experiments. Only 32% of the 4-year-olds and 27% of the 5-year-olds gave a response that indicated that they chose the logical response (i.e. they left the boxes untouched); even fewer seven year olds did so (17%). Scalar-inference making is more apparent in the children even as the developmental ordering remains marked. Pragmatic inference-making is affected by task ease (and appears to continue to be affected by the level of sophistication on the part of the hearer). This is evidence that the ability to draw implicatures is not uniquely linked to maturity. By making a task easy enough, we have encouraged children to apply their available resources to draw the scalar inference.
Pragmatically enriching "and"
Does this developmental effect extend to non-scalar cases? Here, we focus on a pragmatic inference linked to and which prompts the same developmental tendency as those described for scalars. To appreciate the pragmatic enrichment in question, consider the two conjunctive utterances in (4). (4) a.
Mary got married and got pregnant.
b. Mary got pregnant and got married.
The two are equivalent from a logical point of view because they both contain the same two components, i.e. P & Q = Q & P. However, the sequence of the conjuncts in each of the two utterances conveys two very different sets of implications. Whereas it would be considered a normal occurrence to hear about someone getting married before getting pregnant (4a); in some parts of the world, it would be considered scandalous to get pregnant before getting married (4b). Without the implicit sequential interpretation, the statement in (4b) would not seem scandalous.
The pragmatic inference linked to and prompts the same debate as the one for scalars.
2 On the one hand, Levinson (Levinson, 1983; 2000) argues that interlocutors "buttress" conjunctions by interpreting and to mean and then and that they do this by default. On the other, Carston, (1996; 2002) points out that there are host of ways in which and can be enriched and argues that none dominate, that context determines which pragmatic enrichment to make and that there is nothing automatic about it.
Below, are just five of the kinds of implications that a conjunctive utterance can convey:
(2) a. Contrast: It's autumn in the U.S. and it's spring in Chile. Carston's account is largely corroborated in two separate studies. Noveck and
Chevaux (2001) presented seven-and ten-year-old children as well as adults a set of 12 stories about everyday events. Among these were four stories that ultimately presented a conjunctive sentence as a comprehension question. For half of the conjunctive comprehension questions, the two events in the question were presented in a sequence that respected the order in the stories and in the other half the sequence was inverted.
To illustrate, consider the short story in (5) and its two kinds of follow-up questions in (6a) and (6b):
(5) While sitting on her couch, Julie was reading a comic book.
Suddenly, the phone rang.
She went out of the living room and ran to answer.
It was Isabelle who was inviting Julie to celebrate her birthday Saturday.
Since they were very good friends, Julie accepted the invitation.
(6a) Julie answered the phone and accepted an invitation? (6b) Julie accepted an invitation and answered the phone?
Whereas the rates of agreement to (6a) are high and accurate for all participants, we found that linguistically competent children are less fussy than adults about sequence in conjunctive sentences. Roughly 85% of seven-year olds, 63% of ten-year-olds, and about 29% of the adults say "Yes" to (6b). This developmental curve resembles the one for scalars. Younger children are more likely to agree with a statement's minimal interpretation because they are less likely to pragmatically enrich the meaning of and.
3
Another piece of evidence supporting Carston's account comes from processing studies that followed up on the paradigm above. Noveck, Chevaux & Bott (2004) enlarged the list of stories and presented them line-by-line on a screen to ten-year-olds and adults. 4 The dependent measures were the Yes/No response to the question as well as the response time it required. The developmental curve for the categorical responses was as before, although there was more pragmatic inferencing in general: The ten-yearolds were significantly more likely than adults to accept the inverted order as true (46% vs. 18%, respectively) and this was the only adult-child comparison to yield significant effects.
Of further interest were ten-year-olds' response times to the two sorts of responses because one could readily draw out processing predictions from the two opposing accounts. On the one hand, if the sequential (buttress) interpretation occurs by 3 It is important to point out that only the ten-year-olds appeared adult-like in all other respects. However, the seven-year-olds tended to respond "Yes" to Control, Invertedorder questions that employed and then explicitly as its conjunction. 4 The stories were highly similar to those in Noveck & Chevaux ( 2001) , but were slightly modified for computer-presentation purposes and were not joined by filler items. There were nine stories altogether and each could be followed with any one of three kinds of comprehension questions: Order-preserved and Order-inversed as before, plus Order-preserved with a false second conjunct. This new type of category, is exemplified in (6c), which is a conclusion for the story shown in (5): (6c) Julie answered the phone and declined the invitation.
default (or is automatic in some form) then "No" responses ought to be quickest and "Yes" responses ought to take at least as long because the latter response requires the cancellation of the buttress. On the other hand, a Relevance account predicts that those who respond "Yes" to the inverted-order questions ought to answer more quickly than those who answer "No" because the pragmatic enrichment occurs subsequent to minimal semantic treatments of and. The data fall in favour of Relevance accounts, which shows that children who answer "No" to the inverted-order questions require (on average) 2 seconds more than those who answer "Yes". Arguably this is not due to a negation bias, because the control question that prompts a correct "No" response led to fastest response times overall (see Footnote 4). Unfortunately, there were too few adult responses that would justify a similar analysis among them, but in the next section I describe adults' processing times in sentence verification tasks that investigate scalar inferences.
Adult studies
While the developmental studies are illuminating, it could be argued that they First of all, our experiments included 6 kinds of sentences all of the form
[quantifier] A are B, with two possible quantifiers (Some and All) and three kinds of set relationships between the As and the Bs --one in which the As are a proper subsets of the Bs (Some/All monkeys are mammals), one in which the Bs are a proper subset of the As (Some/All mammals are monkeys) and a third where the As and the Bs form two disjoint sets (Some/All monkeys are fish). As can be seen in Finally, an on-line investigation allowed us to be creative with our presentation.
One could present the sentences one word at a time or an entire sentence at a time. We could also require participants to hurry by putting time limits or encourage them to take their time. All told, this form of experimentation allows us to create various experimental contexts as we ask participants to respond to Underinformative items and their controls.
Before continuing the description of the experiments, it is important to point out that classic categorisation studies (much like the classic developmental studies mentioned earlier) did pay some attention to the infelicitous Underinformative items.
However, most dealt with the bivocality of Some largely by sidestepping it. Response time experiments have generally instructed their participants to interpret Some in a strictly logical way (i.e. without the scalar inference). For example, Meyer (1970) told participants to treat some as meaning some and possibly all in a sentence verification task with sentences like some pennies are coins. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one psychological study to take an interest in the potentially conflicting interpretations of such underinformative sentences (Rips, 1975) . Rips investigated how participants make category judgments by using sentence verification tasks with materials like some congressmen are politicians. He examined the effect of the quantifier interpretation by running two experiments, one in which participants were asked to treat some as some and possibly all and another where they were asked to treat some as some but not all. This comparison demonstrated that the participants given the some but not all instructions in one Experiment responded more slowly than those given the some and possibly all instructions in another. Despite these indications, Rips modestly hedged when he concluded that "of the two meanings of Some, the informal meaning may be the more difficult to compute" (italics added). His reaction of course is not uncommon.
Many colleagues share the intuition that the pragmatic interpretation seems more natural. In any case, this is an initial finding that goes in favour of the Relevance account.
Our studies picked up where Rips left off. In Experiment 1, we replicated Rips (1975, experiments 2 and 3) in one overarching procedure. Participants took part in two sessions. In one, participants were instructed to interpret the quantifier some to mean some and possibly all, which we refer to as the Logical condition and in the other, they were told to interpret some to mean some but not all, which we will refer to as the Pragmatic condition (and, of course, session order was counterbalanced). Central to our interests was the accuracy and the speed of response to the Underinformative sentences (e.g. Some monkeys are mammals) under the two conditions. According to the Default Inference account, a False response should be faster than a True response because the latter ought to occur as a result of the default inference's cancellation. In contrast,
Relevance Theory would predict that a False response occurs more slowly than a true response because the False response would arise when Relevance conditions are applied more stringently, resulting in the production of the scalar inference.
The results showed that when participants were under instruction to, in effect, draw the scalar inference they required significantly more time to evaluate the underinformative sentences than when they were under instructions to provide a logical response. In fact, a response that entails the presence of a scalar inference (i.e. to say As can be seen in Table 14 .1, the main finding here is that mean reaction times were longer when participants responded pragmatically to the Underinformative sentences than when they responded logically. Furthermore, pragmatic responses to the Underinformative sentences appear to be slower than responses to all of the control sentences, indicating that the scalar inference prompts an evaluation that is characteristically different from all the other items. Collectively, these two experiments provide further evidence against the default inference view because there is no indication that Underinformative items prompt participants to take more time to arrive at a true response than they do to a false response. All indications point to the opposite being true: A logical response is an initial reaction to Underinformative sentences and it is indistinguishable from responses to control sentences while a pragmatic response to Underinformative items is significantly slower than a logical response as well as to the other items in the task.
Some colleagues wonder whether the Pragmatic responses we record are slow because in general judging some statement to be false takes more time than judging it to be true. We argue against that by pointing out that three of the control sentences also require a "false" response and their reaction times are significantly faster than the Pragmatic response. Consider the sentences we classify as T5, which is exemplified by All mammals are elephants (which includes many of the same elements as Some elephants are mammals). Such items prompt 97% of participants to respond False correctly and at a speed that is significantly faster than when they respond False to Underinformative sentence. 5 It also cannot be argued that the Pragmatic responses are simply due to error (where participants intend to say "True" but hit the wrong button) because the percentage of participants making Pragmatic responses is of a characteristically different order when compared to those making errors in the control conditions (roughly 60% choose False to the Underinformative item as opposed to 3-13% who make errors across all the control conditions). We argue that these results indicate that the scalar inference is at the root of the extraordinary slowdown in this paradigm. It is drawn specifically in reaction to the underinformative items and prompts an unusually large number of participants to ultimately choose False. Furthermore, it arrives as a secondary process relative to a justifiable logical interpretation; it does not appear to arrive by default.
Although our experiments provide evidence against the idea that scalar inferences become available as part of a default interpretation, they do not necessarily provide evidence that directly supports the Relevance account. Our third experiment, which adopted the general procedure of both Experiment 1 (sentences were presented one word at a time) and Experiment 2 (participants were free to treat Some as they wished), was designed to test predictions from Relevance theory concerning the processing of scalar inference. The crucial manipulation was the time available for the response; in one condition participants have a relatively long time to respond (3000 msecs, this is referred to as the Long condition), while in the other they are given a short time to respond (900 msecs, this is referred to as the Short condition). By requiring participants to respond quickly in one condition, we limited the cognitive resources they have at their disposal.
Expectations based on the Relevance account are that participants would be more likely to respond with a quick "True" response when they have less time than when they have more. If one wanted to make predictions based on default interpretations, some should be interpreted to mean some but not all more often in the short condition than in the long condition (or at least there should be no difference between the two conditions).
The results show that while the rate of correct performance among the control sentences either improves or remains constant with added response time, responses were such that there were significantly more Logical responses to the Underinformative items in the Short condition than in the Long condition: 72% True in the Short condition and 56%
True in the Long condition. This trend is in line with predictions made by Relevance Theory.
Disjunctions
This time-enriched pragmatic effect has been extended to disjunctions. Imagine that an experiment presents a five letter word and participants are required to respond with a Yes or No to statements such as There is a T or a B. As one could imagine, all possible truth-conditions can be introduced, including the one synonymous with the underinformative items above. That is, if the word that preceded the statement above were TABLE, then the statement could provide a Logical interpretation (to say "True"
because indeed there is a T; there is a B) or a Pragmatic interpretation (to say "False"
because there is both a T and a B). In work carried out in collaboration with Valentina Lanzetti, Lewis Bott & Dan Sperber, one sample reveals that when participants are encouraged to respond within a second (they are told that their responses are not recorded in cases where they take longer than a second), participants' rates of Logical responses are roughly 84%. When they are given an unlimited amount of time to decide, their rates of Logical responses drop to around 55%. As before, it is important to point out that the unambiguous control problems (in this case, half of all included statements using the connective and) yielded rates of correct responses that were very high across all conditions. The evidence indicates that indeed minimal interpretations serve as the basis for quick judgements and that pragmatic responses arrive subsequently.
6. Neuropsychological measures and pragmatic inference making
Evoked Potentials
In order to get at immediate reactions that might run deeper than reaction times, colleagues and I have also investigated Evoked Response Potentials (Noveck & Posada, 2003) . ERP studies typically present specific anomalies in a sentence in order to capture a characteristic pattern that follows (see Coulson, Chapter 9). Kutas and Hillyard (1980) pointed out how semantic anomalies give rise to a central parietal negative-going component that peaks about 400 msec after the appearance of an inappropriate word, like socks in (7); this is known as an N400: 1998, for a similar argument with respect to a categorization paradigm).
fMRI
More comprehensive work using imaging techniques is underway with Vinod
Goel. The interest here is to see which brain regions are involved in the true vs. false responses (the logical vs. pragmatic responses) to Underinformative items. One study that is now being carried out includes both All and Some as quantifiers and a large set of stimuli (similar to those in Bott and Noveck, such as Some monkeys are mammals).
These are some of the questions that this fMRI work is ultimately meant to address: Right frontal areas are known to be the centers of reconciliation of conflicting information (see Goel & Dolan, 2003; Noveck, Goel, & Smith, in press ) as well as for "contextual" and figurative meanings (Bookheimer, 2002) ; will a negative reply to underinformative items prompt activity in an area such as in the right anterior cingulate, which is engaged in tasks that require planning and satisfying goals and subgoals (Koechlin, Basso, Pietrini, Panzer, & Grafman, 1999) or will pragmatic inferences prompt activity uniquely in language areas like Broca's area? Will a false response to
Some monkeys are mammals prompt activity that is different from what is found for a patently false item like Some monkeys are fish? If so, one might be able to localize brain regions that concern themselves with pragmatic inference-making. Is neural activity prompted by pragmatic inferencing with scalars similar to other kinds of pragmaticsinduced neural activity (e.g. to metaphor and other pragmatic enrichments)? This is an area of research that is in infancy, but will surely be tackled with the expansion of experimental pragmatics.
Conclusions
The developmental data show that the production of scalar inference is possible for children (consider seven year olds who are largely "pragmatic" with simple tasks in Pouscoulous et al.) but effortful (now consider seven-to-ten year olds on similar but slightly more difficult tasks in Pouscoulous et al. and in Noveck, 2001 who are "logical"). If a scalar were indeed a default inference linked to a lexical item, adding a little complexity to a task ought not to block it so readily. It is hard to argue that children are more likely to cancel scalar inferences than adults because that implies that children are applying more effort than adults. The evidence shows that young children whose responses do not reveal the drawing of the scalar inference have simply not considered it.
The adult time-course data tell a similar story. 7.1 A final word about the role for experimentation in linguistic-pragmatics 6 One could argue that it is the production of negative information (not both, not all etc.) that is the very cause of the slowdown in a scalar inference. However, note how the pragmatic enrichment of and also prompts a slowdown (when compared to a "logical" interpretation) yet it cannot be attributed to negative information. The enrichment in these studies concerns adding a sequential marker such as then. This is an indication that it is the pragmatic step itself that slows participants down and not necessarily its output. 7 The grammatical phenomena that Chierchia highlights in Chapter 13 and that led to the investigation in Noveck, Chierchia, Chevaux, Guelminger & Sylvestre (2002) is compatible with an account that a) assumes that there is one minimal meaning of scalar terms that is selectively enriched and that b) denies a role for defaults concerning scalar inferences. Relevance Theory can account for Chierchia's grammatical cases when one views the production of scalar inference as a relatively effortful step that makes an utterance more informative. Informativeness also explains why the lack of scalar inference is more common in the antecedent of conditionals, as in If P or Q then R; a truth table analysis shows that there are fewer true cases when the disjunction is inclusive.
